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Abstract 
People have tended to load their different conceptions of democracy with their own 
political ideals; in this paper it is argued that normative and definitional questions 
should rather be separated, so that political philosophers and political scientists 
may adopt the same concept of democracy, even if they disagree normatively or 
politically. Moreover, it is argued that we should replace an absolute notion of 
democracy by a relativized notion, which allows for different degrees of 
democraticity. This facilitates the separation of normative and conceptual issues 
and it is convenient in contexts in which “democratic deficits” are discussed – as 
e.g. when democracy is to be implemented on a supranational level. Moreover, it 
has the consequence that democratic deficits are not necessarily bad. 
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Introduction 
There are competing conceptions of democracy. In particular, political philosophers 
and political scientists have defined the terms “democracy” and “democratic” in 
many different ways.1 Which one is right? How should one choose among the 
proposed definitions? 
A democracy is perhaps always a State, but the adjective “democratic” is often 
applied to other entities as well; for example, organizations, collective decisions, 
decision methods, personalities, families, and so on. However, in what follows, I 
shall concentrate upon States and certain similar political organizations or societies, 
such as unions and confederations of States.  
The problem of how to choose among different conceptions of democracy might be 
held to be, at least partly, a normative question. Presumably, different philosophers 
propose different concepts of democracy because they evaluate types of political 
organizations differently; each favours the definition that picks out his or her 
favourite type of society. However, I recommend that we separate the normative 
and the definitional questions. In this way, different thinkers may adopt the same 
concept of democracy, even if they disagree normatively. This would facilitate 
theorizing concerning democracy. 
But is this possible? Would not everyone still want to reserve the term “democracy” 
for his particular version of a good society? Do we not all think of ourselves as 
democrats? Yes, I believe this is true of all or nearly all of those who take part in 




I suggest that this might be possible if we think of democracy in relative terms, i.e. 
as a matter of degree. Primarily, we should not regard democraticity as a property 
of certain societies. Rather, we should opt for a two-place relation of democraticity 
(“society A is more democratic than society B”). Moreover, we may assume that 
this relation is asymmetric and transitive, but not connected. In other words, no 
society is more democratic than itself; if A is more democratic than B and B is more 
democratic than C, then A is more democratic than C; but we should not assume 
that for every pair of societies A and B, either A is more democratic than B, or B is 
more democratic than A, or A and B are equally democratic.  
This should be helpful, for once democracy is taken to be a matter of degrees, it is 
possible to define it in such a way that everyone could agree that a higher degree 
of democracy is not automatically better.  
Moreover, we can allow that two societies, A and B, are both democratic, but that A 
is nevertheless more democratic than B. When we use the term “democratic” as a 
one-place relation in such contexts, we might just take it to refer to societies where 
there is “government by the people” in at least some fairly reasonable sense and to 
some fairly substantial extent. This is vague, of course, but here vagueness is 
tolerable. 
However, it would perhaps still not be so easy to establish a scientific consensus 
regarding the precise definition of a two-place relation like the one indicated here. 
Therefore, it would probably be expedient as well as clarifying to adopt a three-
place relation of democraticity in terms of which we may say of two societies A and 
B, e.g., that both are democratic, but that A is more democratic than B in a certain 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Frank Cunningham, Theories of Democracy, London and New York: Routledge, 2002.  
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respect R1, while B is more democratic that A in respect R2.2 I suspect that it would 
be comparatively easy to reach a consensus concerning such matters. And if so, it 
would presumably not be necessary or even desirable to have a conception which 
allows us to determine which one of A or B is more democratic than the other – or 
that they are equally democratic. 
This method of substituting a one-place property by one or more many-place 
relations – in terms of which one may subsequently define various one-place 
properties as needed – is a scientifically progressive and fairly well known way of 
handling contested and problematic notions in many areas. 
 
2. Starting-point and method 
My purpose in this paper is not to construct an explicit and precise definition of 
democraticity. Rather, I shall indicate a number of features and distinctions that 
might be taken into account if one wants to adopt a relativized concept of 
democraticity. We should start from something rather uncontroversial, namely that 
democracy is “government by the people”. This is what you will often find in a 
dictionary. But it is of course very unspecific. The problem is that “the people” can 
“govern” in many different ways – e.g. more or less indirectly.  
Presumably, the people can govern, even if it does not consider and decide every 
single issue. It is just the same in a dictatorship. A dictator need not himself (or 
herself) decide every single issue concerning the government; some decisions may 
be delegated to others, and it is still a dictatorship even if some of the decisions 
made by others happen not to be in accordance with the actual will of the dictator. 
Similarly, mutatis mutandis, with a democracy. 
One may ask who are referred to by the phrase “the people”. Take the people of 
Sweden, for example. Does this include every citizen? Even children? Are 
immigrants who have not yet been awarded citizenship included? In Abraham 
Lincoln’s phrase, democracy is “government of the people, by the people, for the 
people”, but in Sweden those who are governed are not the same as those who 
govern (in the sense that they have the right to vote). Hence, I think we can say 
that Sweden is not fully democratic, since some of those who are governed are not 
allowed to participate in government. It would be more democratic – but not 
necessarily better – if everyone in Sweden were allowed to participate in 
government. 
This example also illustrates my earlier point about the importance of distinguishing 
definitional from normative questions. Clearly, it is quite reasonable to restrict the 
right to vote to citizens who have reached a certain age; small children cannot be 
expected to be sufficiently informed about political questions and they are probably 
not able to vote in a responsible way. Therefore, the whole people should not be 
allowed to “govern”. So a lesser degree of democracy, in this respect, is to be 
preferred. 
 
3. Formal and material aspects 
As far as I know, the Danish philosopher and legal scientist Alf Ross is one of the 
few who has attempted a definition of “democracy” which explicitly allows for 
degrees of democraticity.3 He says he wants to identify an “ideal type” of 
                                                 
2 Different examples of such “respects” or dimensions will be mentioned in sections 2 – 14 below. 
3 See Alf Ross, Varför demokrati? (“Why democracy?”), Stockholm: Tidens förlag, 1968. However, in 
many contexts Ross nevertheless uses the term “democracy” in an absolute sense, e.g. when he says 
that “democracy is the form of government which gives a maximum of political freedom, in the sense of 
autonomy, to the citizens” (p. 108, my translation). And in certain places he seems to identify 
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democracy, with three dimensions of variation: intensity, efficiency, and extensity. 
These dimensions correspond to what I called three-place relations of democraticity 
in section 1 above. However, Ross seems to make somewhat stronger assumptions 
about his dimensions than I do – he seems to think of them as measurable on 
interval scales with fixed maxima and minima – and, more importantly, he regards 
his three dimensions as exhaustive, whereas I assume that there are many others 
in addition.  
This last point is connected with the fact that his notion of democracy is more 
formal or legalistic than mine. For him democracy is a form of government, 
presumably specified in a constitution, whereas I want to suggest that actual 
behaviour and attitudes are also important. For example, it seems to me that there 
is more “government by the people” in a nation where there is a high degree of 
political participation among citizens than there is if political apathy is the dominant 
attitude (other things being equal). For Ross, on the other hand, participation is 
conceptually irrelevant. Of course, like most democrats he believes that 
participation is a good thing, but increased participation does not bring us closer to 
his ideal type of democracy. His ideal type is insensitive to material aspects, such 
as the degree of participation. 
As a matter of fact, it seems that democracy in a formal sense is compatible with 
dictatorship in material terms. For example, it is often said that the constitution of 
the Soviet Union was democratic even though in reality it was a dictatorship, at 
least during the last decades of Stalin’s reign. Again, I would say that Sweden 
would not be very democratic – perhaps not even a democracy – if only a tiny 
fraction of the people in Sweden voted in general elections and if most Swedes had 
no political preferences and were only interested in sex, sport and soap operas. 
Under such conditions there would be no “government by the people”, even if the 
constitution would remain just as it is today. 
Ross’s three dimensions can be explained as follows.4 Intensity is the percentage of 
“the people” who have the right to vote. For example, democraticity was increased 
when women were enfranchised.5 Efficiency is the degree to which the people can 
really decide issues. For example, efficiency is at a maximum were there is direct 
democracy, in the sense that the people decide all issues by direct voting. There is 
less efficiency in a representative democracy, especially if the government can to 
some extent act independently of Parliament, or if there is a House of Lords or 
some independently appointed legislative body that shares the power with elected 
members of Parliament. So parliamentarism increases the degree of democraticity. 
Similarly, if general elections occur more often, democraticity is increased. 
Extensity is the extent to which popular influence and control applies to different 
areas or branches of public decision-making. Maximum extensity is reached when 
the people control not only the legislative power in parliament, but also the 
executive power of the Government and the judicial power of the courts. I suppose 
Ross would say that extensity, and thereby democraticity, is also increased if chiefs 
of police – and perhaps also ordinary policemen – are directly appointed by popular 
vote. 
Ross is quite explicit that his “ideal type” of democracy is not necessarily a moral or 
political ideal; more democracy, in his sense, is not necessarily better. But he does 
not always stick to this distinction. For example, he says that maximum intensity 
                                                                                                                                               
democracy with the majority principle (see e.g. pp. 111-114). Again, he also says that compromise is 
the essence of democracy (p. 120). 
4 See Ross (1968), pp. 92-95. 
5 Ross is not quite consistent on this point. On p. 94 percentage seems to be the main factor, but on p. 
91 he claims that some exclusions are worse than others, independently of numbers. Thus, he says that 
“it is more undemocratic to exclude people with an income under a certain level than to exclude women, 
even if the latter are more numerous” (my translation). His reason for this rather surprising view is that 
exclusion of the former kind is more “politically important” (see p. 92). 
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requires only that all adult members of the people have the right to vote,6 but he 
also admits that the “logical limit” is that every human individual has this right.7 I 
think he should have said that, while the former is better, the latter is more 
democratic. The reason why those who are 18 years old should be allowed to vote, 
but not those who are only 17, is surely normative rather than purely practical or 
somehow dependent upon the very concept of democracy. 
However, as mentioned above, it seems to me that democracy is not merely a 
matter of formal or legal aspects. Intensity in Ross’s sense is purely formal but the 
actual turnout in elections is also important for democrats. For example, those who 
think that there is a “democratic deficit” in the EU or in the USA sometimes 
emphasize precisely the low turnout in general elections. So it is plausible to let 
democraticity depend upon turnout as well. This is not the same as participation, 
for participation may include a great many activities besides voting. 
It should be noticed that material intensity could presumably be increased by legal 
means. For example, a more or less heavy fine could be imposed on those who fail 
to cast their vote. If the fine is sufficiently heavy, turnout might very well approach 
a hundred percent. I have the impression, however, that this is not relevant for 
Ross’s formal notion of intensity. 
 
4. Direct democracy 
If the people should govern to a maximal degree, it seems that intensity, extensity, 
and efficiency in Ross’s sense – as well as in a more material sense – should be 
maximal.  
Let us consider extensity. Maximal democracy seems to imply that the people as a 
whole should do everything that is ordinarily done within the legislative, executive 
and judicial branches of government. For example, the people should not only vote 
on certain legislative proposals; they should also make such proposals. And they 
should discuss among themselves how they should act in given situations and how 
they should solve political problems. Obviously, this is impossible in practice. It 
may work in small groups, but not on the level of national politics. In real life, 
democracy must be far from direct. 
Moreover, it is not clear that government by the people ought to be as extensive as 
is practically possible. For example, it might be possible to increase the extent to 
which the people of Sweden directly decide legal issues ordinarily handled by the 
courts and economic decisions ordinarily made by the Central Bank of Sweden, but 
this would hardly be desirable.8 Apart from the practical difficulties, it would 
probably decrease the quality of the decisions. Judges and members of the Central 
Bank of Sweden have a training that is presumably of some importance for their 
ability to make good decisions.9   
For similar reasons, direct democracy it is not even desirable in legislation – except 
perhaps in some very special cases. In other words, efficiency in Ross’s sense ought 
to be rather limited. This is congenial to the views of those of us who prefer some 
kind of representative democracy. The main reason for preferring representative 
democracy is, of course, that efficiency in Ross’s sense can be expected to be 
incompatible with efficiency in a more utilitarian sense. The common good can be 
                                                 
6 Ibid. p. 94. 
7 Ibid. p. 91. 
8 Even so, someone may of course hold that, other things being equal, extensivity ought to be as high 
as possible. But other things are often not equal.  
9 In view of recent events in Europe and the U. S., I should perhaps add that I do not believe that the 
members of central banks always make the right decisions. For all I know, they may be wrong more 
often than not. 
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more effectively served by politicians than by people in general, since the former 
have a special training in these matters and also more time and opportunities to 
find the best solutions. It is also very important that they have to argue for their 
decisions in public and they can be held responsible for them in retrospect.  
It might be argued that these advantages of representative democracy could be 
somehow imitated within the framework of direct democracy. If every citizen were 
to play the part of a politician – as in direct democracy – he or she should perhaps 
be forced to argue in public for his or her view on every issue in advance and to 
accept responsibility in retrospect. In practice, however, this would be too time-
consuming, and it is not easy to see how responsibility for bad decisions could be 
exacted in retrospect. Citizens can hardly be voted out of “office”. In any case, the 
disadvantages of direct democracy illustrate the (rather obvious) point that more 
democracy can be worse than less democracy.10 
 
5. Economic democracy 
It is sometimes argued that democracy should be extended to the economic 
activities in society. This can be interpreted in several ways; what I have in mind 
here is the idea that decisions concerning the use of capital and the production of 
goods and services should be made or ultimately controlled by the State, i.e. by the 
Government or by parliament. Socialism, in other words, or more precisely State 
socialism in conjunction with democracy.11   
Ross does not claim that economic democracy would increase democratic extensity. 
I suppose this is because his notion of democracy is purely formal. For him, 
extensity is a matter of the traditional branches of government. However, extensity 
might be taken in a broader and more material sense. We may take the executive 
branch of government to include production of goods and services as well as 
investment and management of capital – or we may take these activities to form a 
fourth branch of government over and above the traditional three. In any case, 
many people would presumably agree that the degree of democraticity would be 
increased by the introduction of economic democracy, i.e. if government of the 
people were not restricted to legislation, executive decisions concerning public 
services, foreign policy, infrastructure and so on, but rather extended to include 
also decisions within commercial and industrial life. And even people who are 
opposed to socialism might agree that, other things being equal, socialism would be 
more democratic that capitalism – as long as it is clearly understood that “more 
democratic” does not entail “better”. Whether or not socialism is better than 
capitalism is a separate issue. It should not be confused with the question of which 
is more democratic. 
However, there is a completely different sense of “economic democracy”, in which 
the term signifies a system where all enterprises and firms are owned by their 
workers or “employees”, who make their decisions by democratic methods (free 
discussion, majority rule, and so on).12 In itself, such a system seems to be 
compatible with political dictatorship, but we might add that it should be combined 
with a democratic State. Furthermore, we may demand that the Government 
controls all banks and investment funds. Individual firms may invest their profits, 
but they may also borrow money for productive investments from the Government. 
Finally, to distinguish the system from ordinary capitalism, we may add that no 
                                                 
10 In order to avoid misunderstanding, I should perhaps add that I do not have the silly view that less 
democracy is always better than more democracy. 
11 Ross regards the phrase “economic democracy” as unclear and ambiguous, and he suggests that a 
better term would be “socialism”, see Ross (1968), p. 138-9. 
12 For example, David Schweickart uses the phrase “economic democracy” in this way in his book After 
Capitalism (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 
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individual capitalists are allowed, but that the Government and associations of 
workers may act like capitalists in a market economy, provided that they operate 
within the limits of the State. Firms may be governed by direct or representative 
democracy.  
So far as I can see, democracy in the workplace would not increase political 
democracy. This is so because individual firms would not be controlled by the 
people, but by the employees. However, if the executive power of the State were to 
control all investment funds – apart from the capital assets of the individual firms – 
it seems that democraticity would indeed be increased. But even so, economic 
democracy in the first sense seems to be more democratic than economic 
democracy in the second sense, other things being equal. Again, however, it does 
not follow that the former is better than the latter. This is a separate and rather 
interesting question. My own feeling, for what it is worth, is that, in this respect, 
less democracy is much better than more democracy. 
 
6. Deliberative democracy 
Some people seem to regard the essence of democracy as collective decisions 
according to the majority principle. By contrast, those who favour deliberative 
democracy stress the public reasoning of free and equal citizens in order to 
establish “the will of the people”, preferably in the form of a consensus. Some 
voting rule like the majority principle is probably indispensable in a democratic 
State, but it is tempting to say that the State’s degree of democraticity is also 
proportional to the degree to which deliberative democracy is realized in it. In order 
to govern, the people must make up its mind. 
On the other hand, there is a limit to the amount of discussion that can be spent on 
political problems and if consensus is required we might be stuck forever on a lot of 
issues. This is not only bad; it is also not a plausible requirement on democracy. 
Democracy is a way of handling incompatible beliefs and preferences in a 
collectivity, and these cannot, and should not, always be discussed away. This may 
be desirable when a compromise, or a consensus on either one of the competing 
positions, would be an improvement over a simple majority decision, but this is 
certainly not always the case. 
Nevertheless, such cases exist, and a democratic process of decision-making should 
therefore try to identify them. Other things being equal, a country in which the 
ideals of deliberative democracy influence decision-making is more democratic than 
countries in which those ideals play no role in practice. 
 
7. The common good 
If democracy is “government of the people, by the people, for the people”, one may 
consider the idea that there is more democracy, the more government is “for the 
people”. We may assume that government is “for the people” to the extent that it 
realizes “the common good”. 
An obvious problem with this suggestion is that “the common good” can be 
understood in many different ways. For example, the time horizon is important; are 
we referring to the common good in the short or the long run? In so far as there 
exists a common good at all, it seems reasonable to define it in terms of the 
preferences of all concerned. The common good may be identified with the greatest 
possible aggregate satisfaction of these preferences. But people’s preferences may 
be over means or ends. Democracy seems to have something to do with the 
former, but not necessarily with the latter. On the other hand, the latter may be 
more important than the former from an evaluative point of view or, in other 
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words, from the point of view of the “common good”. Consequently, I suggest that 
the degree of democraticity is completely independent of the degree to which the 
common good is realized by political decision-making. 
Another interpretation of “for the people” is that the people should only have its 
own interests in mind when it governs. For example, on this interpretation Swedish 
voters should only be concerned with Swedish interests when they vote, not with 
the interests of the whole European Union and even less with the interests of 
people in the rest of the world. Sweden would be less democratic, on this 
understanding, if Swedes also tried to improve the situation of people in other 
countries. This is a strange view of democracy and I do not recommend it. 
 
8. Changes of power 
If several parties in a country compete for political power, there seems to be more 
“government by the people” if the parties take turns at governing than if one party 
governs all the time. In the short run, it may be unavoidable that a certain party or 
coalition of parties – or a certain section of the population – has the power to 
decide what the State should do, but if there are changes of power now and then, 
there is nevertheless a sense in which, over time, the whole people governs. By 
contrast, if one party governs nearly all the time, there is rather government by a 
certain part of the people – and this part may not even constitute a majority, much 
less a significant majority. Consequently, changes of power may be said to increase 
the degree of democraticity in a country. 
But, once again, we cannot infer from this that changes of power are always or ever 
valuable. It is sometimes said that changes of power are valuable for their own 
sake. This is not plausible. Whether or not they are good depends upon the 
consequences in particular cases.  
Personally, I believe that changes of power can often have a certain instrumental 
value. For example, certain political decisions may be desirable from the point of 
view of the common good, but because of close ties to special interests or of party 
prestige a given party may be unable to make them, while another party might 
make them quite easily. Therefore, if the parties alternate in power, they may 
together make more desirable decisions over a period of time than if only one party 
had been in power over the whole period. Moreover, if there is real competition 
among parties because no party can take a certain majority of the votes for 
granted, and if different parties or coalitions of parties can shoulder the 
responsibilities of government and thereby educate themselves, the results of 
political decision making can be expected to be better than if one party is more or 
less automatically re-elected over and over again.  
On the other hand, if changes of power occur too frequently, government would 
probably be focused too much on results in the short run. Perhaps something like 
eight to ten years would be a suitable period for a party to be in office. 
 
9. Democratic parties 
If parties nominate members of Parliament and other officials, it makes a difference 
whether or not the parties make these decisions in a democratic way. For example, 
do they choose their leaders by direct democratic methods or is it a matter of more 
or less secret manipulation within a small elite? 
Thus, I suggest that a democratic country with a party system is more or less 
democratic depending upon the democraticity of the political parties. The 
democraticity of the country is partly determined by the democraticity of the 
parties. 
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It might be suggested that political parties ought to be democratic in just the same 
way as countries ought to be democratic. But this is by no means obvious. For 
example, direct democracy as well as democratic centralism may be more 
acceptable for parties than for countries. 
 
10. Corruption 
If special interests (big business, labour unions, farmers, very rich individuals, etc.) 
have the power to enforce or influence governmental or party decisions, there is 
correspondingly less government by the people. Normally, such power is not 
legitimized in the constitution, but it may nevertheless be quite real.  
All cases of this kind may not be ordinarily called “corruption”. This term may be 
used in more or less inclusive senses. In the strictest sense, it only covers cases 
where officials use their administrative or governmental powers for illegitimate 
private enrichment. Even in this strict sense, there are degrees of corruption. 
According to the World Bank, countries like Finland, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Sweden, Denmark and Austria have the least corruption, while Bangladesh, Nigeria, 
Myanmar and Angola have the most.13 It is often said that corruption undermines 
democracy.  
In a more inclusive sense, there is also corruption when officials favour some 
individual or some group of people for the good of their party, for example in the 
form of financial contributions or campaign support. But it is clearly difficult to draw 
a sharp line between corruption in this sense and morally and politically legitimate 
attempts to improve the situation of certain citizens (for example, the worst off or 
the entrepreneurs). Such attempts and corresponding political promises may 
inspire citizens to support certain politicians financially or otherwise.  
But even if certain mild kinds of “corruption” are sometimes morally legitimate, 
they may nevertheless decrease democraticity – at least if they are not balanced off 
by similar corruption or support for other political agents. However, this is quite 
acceptable and nothing to worry about, if democraticity is conceptually independent 
of desirability. As I suggest it should be. 
 
11. Minority and individual rights 
Democracy as such – i.e. government by the people – does not presuppose or 
involve minority or individual rights over and above the general right of citizens to 
participate in government. But so-called liberal democracy is often taken to involve 
certain further rights. Such rights are, for example, “the right to life, liberty and 
security of person”, the right to “equal protection of the law”, the right “to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers”, the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association, the right “to work, to free choice of employment, to just 
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment”.14  
Now, it can be held that political rights of this kind tend to decrease democracy, 
since they constitute a constraint upon the power of the people. Since the people 
are not allowed to violate individual rights, democratic efficiency is to that extent 
reduced.  
Another question is whether, in a democracy, the minority should have any right to 
be respected or catered for by the majority. Should the majority only provide for its 
                                                 
13 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_corruption. 
14 The rights mentioned here are taken from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the 
United Nations in 1948. 
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own interests or should it also to some obligatory degree satisfy the demands of 
the minority?  
More precisely, there are two questions involved here. First, is it morally desirable 
that the majority respects the minority? Second, is it part of democracy that the 
majority respects the minority?15 The first question may be answered differently in 
different cases. But the answer to the second question seems to me to be 
affirmative. In order for the people to govern, it seems that the people as a whole 
should have some influence on government. If this influence cannot be wholly 
realized by voting power, it may also be a matter of minority rights.  
Some theorists may of course disagree. In particular, those who take the essence 
of democracy to be decision-making in accordance with the majority rule can be 
expected to claim that the democraticity of a country is quite independent of 
whether or not the majority recognizes an obligation to take minority interests into 
account – and a corresponding minority right. But those who are against minority 
rights should argue this on moral grounds. That the people govern is one thing, 
that it votes is another. 
 
12. Proportional representation 
Do small minorities have a right to seats in Parliament or should there be an 
election threshold against small parties, parties with, say, less that four percent of 
the votes? It is sometimes said that such a threshold is undemocratic. On the other 
hand, the absence of a threshold would allow small parties to have more influence 
than is motivated by their support among the citizens.16 
However, it seems quite unwarranted to say that democracy requires strict 
proportionality. “Government by the people” may be a vague idea, but it seems 
incompatible with a situation in which a very small party – especially if it is 
generally and correctly regarded as “extremist” by most citizens – has 
disproportionate power in that it can dictate policy and force the acceptance of 
decisions that most citizens dislike. 
 
13. Discrimination 
Almost everyone would agree, nowadays, that without women’s suffrage, there 
would be a serious democratic deficit. However, we may go one step further. If 
women have in fact less opportunity to participate in politics on an equal basis – 
even if there are no legal constraints – there is also less democracy. Therefore, 
patriarchy undermines democracy. Government by the male part of the people is 
not the same as government by the people. 
Similarly with other kinds of discrimination or oppression, such as those related to 
age, sexual orientation, physical disability, ethnicity, race, class, and so on. Thus, 
“pro-liberal democrats see such things as racial or sexist discrimination that 
excludes people from forming potentially effective political organizations as not just 
wrong but as undemocratic”.17 I would add that even if such discrimination is not 
legitimized by the constitution or other legislation in the country or political 
organization under discussion – and even if it is, on the contrary, expressly 
                                                 
15 Of course, there is also the more pragmatic question of whether it would be a rational strategy for 
the majority to respect the minority in a certain situation. This is not (part of) the question I have in 
mind here. 
16 In the 2006 general election in Sweden, the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) did not get 
enough votes to get into parliament. However, without the 4% election threshold they would have 
received ten seats, and consequently the winning alliance of four non-socialist parties would not have 
had a majority in the parliament. The winning alliance was not supported by a majority of the voters.  
17 Cunningham (2002), p. 68. 
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declared illegal – the country is less democratic to the extent that there is actual 
discrimination in it.  
 
14. Subsidiarity 
The so-called subsidiarity principle requires that political decisions be made on the 
lowest possible level. Is subsidiarity entailed by democraticity? In other words, is a 
political association more democratic the more it realizes the ideal of subsidiarity?  
The thought that democraticity increases with subsidiarity might be involved when 
eurosceptics claim that there is a democratic deficit in the EU. At least, they would 
probably say that the EU would be more democratic if more decisions were made 
separately by the member States rather than by the European Parliament or by the 
Council. But why would this be more democratic? Perhaps the idea is that there is 
more democracy when decisions are “closer to the citizens” or “closer to those who 
are primarily affected”. But decisions made by a member State are only “closer” to 
the citizens of that particular State; it is further away from the other citizens of the 
EU – and thereby from the majority of the citizens. Moreover, in many cases the 
other citizens of the EU are significantly affected by the decisions of a member 
State; many of the former may be more affected than some of the latter.  
It must be admitted, of course, that the phrase “government by the people” is not 
sufficiently precise to settle the question of whether democracy increases or 
decreases with subsidiarity. But that is quite all right. The question of what is the 
most suitable degree of subsidiarity – for a given kind of decision or branch of 
politics – is a substantial political and normative question that should not be 
confused with questions of terminology. Consequently, I propose that democracy 
should not be taken to increase with subsidiarity; rather, democraticity increases 
when political power is shared equally by all citizens of the relevant political 
association.18 In other words, the more subsidiarity, the less democracy – other 
things being equal. But, as before, more democracy is not automatically better.  
 
15. Conclusion 
If, as I have argued, normative questions should be clearly separated from 
questions of democraticity, there is an important and to my mind welcome 
conclusion to be drawn: the fact that X is more democratic than Y is not 
automatically a decisive reason for preferring X to Y. The reasons for preferring X to 
Y have to be more substantial. The fact that X is more democratic than Y may very 
well be one such reason, but this should then be recognized as a potentially 
controversial normative or political proposition that needs further support; it should 
not be taken as a conceptual triviality. Ideally, the concept of democracy or 
“government by the people” should be defined in a way that could be accepted by 
all political parties. Political disputes can then be clearly recognized as such and 
they should not be mixed up with mere questions of correct vocabulary. For 
example, it may be agreed that a higher degree of direct democracy or of economic 
democracy entails a higher degree of democraticity (other things being equal). 
Everyone should be able to accept that, but the question of whether more direct 
                                                 
18 A further question is what political associations would in this sense be “relevant”. This is what is 
sometimes also called “the boundary problem”. See e.g. my paper “Democracy and political boundaries”, 
in Folke Tersman (ed.), The Viability and desirability of global democracy, Stockholm Studies in 
Democratic Theory, Vol. III, Stockholm University 2007, pp. 14-32, and several other papers within the 
same research project. 
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democracy or economic democracy is also better is a separate question that needs 
to be handled as a substantial political issue.19   
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19 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
